



A case study in systems failure: NZ's Mangatepopo Tragedy

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**Managing
Risk**

Systems Planning
for Outdoor
Adventure
Programs



Presentation Outcomes:

1. Present existing analysis of event within context of system failure
2. Provide framework for understanding how individuals, systems, and organizations interact in crisis situations



“It takes just the right combination of circumstances to produce a catastrophe.”

Perrow (1999) author of Normal Accident Theory

The Fallout

- Coroner's inquest

Devonport, C.J. (March 30, 2010). *Report of Coroner, In The Coroner's Court held at Auckland, February 15 to February 19, 2010.*


- Internal Review as per OPC Trustees

- Media interest (long running)



Operator Error vs. Latent / System errors

Organizational shell





The Fallout

- Coroner's inquest

Devonport, C.J. (March 30, 2010). *Report of Coroner, In The Coroner's Court held at Auckland, February 15 to February 19, 2010.*

- Internal Review as per OPC Trustees

- NZ Dept. of Labour charges

under Health and Safety Employment Act (OPC pleads guilty of 2 charges, \$480,000 fines)

- NZ implements national safety regulations and auditing system

Making it an offence to provide activities involving significant hazards and some level of instruction or leadership without a current safety audit certificate, as of Oct 1 2011




“Human error is a consequence,
not a cause.”

Reason (1997), Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents



Systems based investigation model:

Based on Snook (2000)



Operator vs. System induced error *


- **Substitution test:**
'Given how events unfolded and were perceived in real time, is it likely that a new individual, with the same training and experience would have behaved any differently?'


Johnston (1995)

Systems Failure:

1. Risk tolerance
2. Systems errors
3. Operational features

Latent conditions: Organizational factors





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
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OPC systems failure: Program Planning System

- Risk and skill
 - Solo instructing
 - No map!
 - Hazard identification
-
- *Practical drift and check in procedure*

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
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
OPC systems failure: Client Information System

- Informed consent*
- Challenge by choice
- Swim confidence vs. ability



OPC systems failure: Equipment Mgt. System


- Radio communication



OPC systems failure: Crisis Mgt. System

- Non-clicking triggers*
- Gorge rescue plan
- Rescue resources
- Learning

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Non-clicking Triggers

- Gradual change research
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 1Cp3Ux85IE>


- Return to [slideshow](#)

OPC systems failure: Staffing/HR System

Root causes:


1. Failure to maintain staff & supervise*
2. Learning lost / turnover
3. Production pressure
4. Competency based assessment

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OPC systems failure: Business Mgt. System


- “Culture of Production” vs. culture of safety



OPC systems failure: Organizational Planning System

- Risk tolerance:
 - Explicit vs. implied*
- Over confidence in systems*

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“We cannot change the human condition; people will always make errors.

We can change the conditions under which they work and make unsafe acts less likely.” Reason (1997)




Key learning:*

1. Risk tolerance: explicit vs. implied
2. Train to failure – recognize non-clicking triggers
3. System function – recognize non-clicking triggers
4. Do my supervisors 'supervise'?
5. Have we forgotten to be afraid?

References / further reading

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Managing Risk

Systems Planning for Outdoor Adventure Programs



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Book info:

TheManagingRiskBook.com

Adventure
Risk Report

AdventureRiskReport.blogspot.com

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