This is a common WFR course scenario. There is a mechanism for a spine injury (the fall onto the head and shoulder) but there is no sign of spine injury. Your sense of the situation is that the patient is a candidate for a focused spine assessment and a decision on whether spine immobilization is warranted.
Let’s focus the discussion on how we make this decision.
What information are you considering? Where did you get it? How accurate is it?
You saw the MOI and you learned in your WFR that landing on your head is a mechanism for a spine injury. This MOI makes sense to you, and the conservative approach you learned about spine injuries makes sense as well even though you know spine injury mechanisms are more educated guess than hard science. Your companion was not impressed by the MOI but follows your lead and controls the spine.
You used your PAS, a logical and widely used assessment scheme, to determine that the only injury appears to be the hematoma (goose egg) on the head. You’re comfortable with your assessment. The patient seems reliable, your assessment skills sound. Knowing about perception and confirmation biases--our tendency to see what we want to be there--you had your companion double check the patient’s LOR and vital sign measurements.
You plan to make your decision based on a protocol for selective spine immobilization, the FSA. Where does this come from? Is it accurate? It’s based on a large study1 identifying criteria for evaluating a spine for injury (reliability, CSM, spine pain/tenderness).* A number of wilderness and urban emergency medicine experts say it’s a good decision tool to use in the field. 2,3,4 You have a memory aid to remind you how to do it. You understand that it is double checking your observations and findings from your initial PAS.
What might be influencing your decision?
Are you eager to release spine immobilization because you really don’t want to deal with a spine injury right now or because the patient is hammering you about letting him get up and wrangle the horses? He says, “It wasn’t a fall. I just kinda slipped off the back of the horse. I’ve had worse crashes in the rodeo.” You wonder if you are overreacting by doing the entire PAS/FSA drill you learned in your WFR course.
Are you skeptical about the FSA because of the emotional influence of a tale you heard, which you can’t substantiate and only vaguely remember, about someone who fell from a horse, got up to walk, and was paralyzed?
Are you tentative because this is the first time you are actually performing this assessment and making the decision on your own?
Are you feeling time pressure to make a decision because of the cowboy’s insistence he take care of his horses?
These thoughts are real. It’s good that you are aware of how you are making this decision and that you are evaluating the quality of the information you have available, the protocols you are using (PAS and FSA), and the influence of your emotions on this decision. It’s called mindful practice--thinking about your thinking. It supports the important and often underappreciated wilderness medicine skill of decision-making.
This brief case study is only the tip of the iceberg of the study of decision-making.